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WARNING! NOTHING ON THIS SITE IS MEANT TO BE LEGAL ADVICE! You should do your homework, calm down, assess the situation, then and only then hire a competent attorney to represent you. GWINNETT COUNTY DOES NOT LIKE PRO-SE LITIGANTS!  

The Goal of this website is to Reduce litigation, Increase mediation , Eliminate the Guardian Ad Litem  from private custody cases and Help facilitate workable joint physical and legal custody arrangements so the child may benefit from  the love, direction and decision making capabilities of both parents.

FIRE your Guardian Ad Litem now!

Get Joint Custody now!

Fire your Attorney Fire your Judge Meeting with a GAL soon? Read this first!
  sample order appointing GAL to show GAL duties What is a Guardian ad Litem?   Going Pro-Se? Click here
  RARE Judge vs GAL case What training does the  GAL have Sue your GAL Breach of fiduciary

The Guardians are usurping the authority of Judicial system. They will do an investigation and present a report based on hearsay and their value system.  If a GAL is involved in your case, Your case will be decided without regard to legal basis, case law, laws governing your state, rules of evidence or proper court room procedure. GUARANTEED!

The GAL is destroying your family, irreparably harming your child's relationship with his parents, creating a resentment among the parties that will last a lifetime and robbing you and your EX blind. This is the money you were going to use to buy your child her braces, his first car or send him to college.

Women around the country are losing custody when they allege abuse that the GAL does not believe. They know that only 5% of households report abuse until divorce proceeding begin and the number jumps to 50%.If there are allegations of abuse please hire a medical professional Do not let a GAL diminish your concerns. However, make false allegations and lose your child. Read this!  If you have been falsely accused read www.falseallegations.com

If there are allegations of  medical neglect warn your ex, take your child to the doctor yourself for God’s sake but never use a GAL as they are not guided by years of medical training or training in child psychology but rather emotion and agendas. 

Their investigations are unguided and their decisions are arbitrary and capricious. 

GAL Court testimony is very sporadic and full of hearsay to mask the superficial nature of her investigation. They take their cues from the “vibe” or “ feelings” of the parties and the Judge. 

The Court System in Atlanta was specifically designed to create turmoil, acrimony and resentment between the parties. The system creates resolutions and agreements between the parties that are intentionally vague to insure future business for the system and remove billions of dollars from hard working families least able to afford it. LOCAL COST OF GAL.

There is no doubt in my mind that Judges and Attorneys could make agreements that are so fair and comprehensive that the possibility of future conflict is totally eliminated.    

  I know , I know. Your Ex- husband treated you like an object or worse and your Ex-wife treated you like a paycheck or worse. 

So what ! Get over it!  We all have our horror stories but the truth is that you knew 50% of all marriages end in divorce when you created your child so wake up and take care of that child the way she deserves.  

Truth: Your child needs both of her parents!  You suck as a single parent.  Joint Physical Custody is what she needs. Cooperate in good faith with your ex until your child is 18. If you are the better or more responsible parent help the other parent! 

I know the sound of your ex-spouse’s voice is like finger nails on a chalkboard but your phone will send text messages and your computer will send email. A small percentage of grown-ups in Gwinnett County arrange joint physical and joint legal custody with no child support and you can too. This will eliminate the system from your life forever. Sample Marital Settlement Agreement / Parenting plan.  

Truth: You are using child support as a weapon. Your child’s needs only food, clothing, and shelter. The total cost of your child’s needs is not $650 per month.  The current guidelines are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. You both must maintain a house with food, air conditioning /heat , electricity and water so why are you charging her child support? You know in your heart it is really get even support or adult support. When your child is with your ex  you can work a part time job if you want extra money. He might be working over time or a part time job to give you child support. Give him the break he deserves.  

Truth: You are using extracurricular activities to control your ex. You are avoiding your responsibility to parent by enrolling your child in more than one activity at a time. Your ex should have full consultation on extracurricular activities and the right to withdraw from any activity due to lack of interest, lack of money or as a result of her desire to spend quality time with your child.  

Truth: You are using final decision making status as a weapon. Your child is entitled to a decision that is  the result of a joint decision making process or mediation. When you can’t reach a decision after 4 hours of mediation you or your ex can be designated as final decision maker. This process insures that the tough decisions are thoroughly researched and debated.  Just include this mediation clause in your agreement.

  You Must !Move back in to the school district so your child can ride the bus home to either house according to a predetermined schedule.  

Anticipate the stages of child development and prepare in advance to cooperate in a manner conducive to raising a mentally and physically well rounded child. You Must ! Support each other in discipline, restrictions, and expectations for school performance. Quit trying to win your child with gifts and promises and commit to raising your child as your child and not your friend. Your child must know the same environment exist in both households.  

Myth: When couples cannot agree or cooperate about matters like how the children should be raised, a judge must decide according to “the best interest of the child.”

 

Fact: It is not the business of government officials to supervise the raising of other people’s children. The entire point of a marriage and family is for mothers and fathers to cooperate and compromise for the sake of children and provide an example to those children of precisely these principles, without which no family can operate. Allowing one parent to surrender both parents’ decision-making rights over the children to government officials because of “disagreement” — without any infraction by the other (who may “disagree” only about losing his or her children) — negates the very principle of private family life and invites collusion between the divorcing parent and state officials.

 

Judges and civil servants are not disinterested. When we give government officials the power to make decisions about the best interest of other people’s children, it may well become the best interest of the officials. Allowing them to control the private lives of citizens’ who have committed no legal infraction simply by invoking “disagreement” gives them an incentive to reward the parent that is being the most disagreeable. That is precisely the reason for the runaway divorce epidemic.

Unfortunately, a recent  development in Georgia Divorce & Family Law is the appointment of Guardian Ad Litem's to cases involving PRIVATE Child Custody. Essentially, a guardian ad litem works with both parents as well as their divorce attorneys to look out for the best interest of the children. In the past these GALs were used to perform a vital function in the juvenile court system representing abused or neglected children. 

Now it has become more mainstream to appoint a GAL in a private custody dispute if one or both or the parties request it. It can become a war of he said she said, cross accusations and innuendos designed to discredit the other parent in the eyes of the GAL and the only winner is the GAL after you pay her fees. 

Among the things a  guardian ad litem will look into are the background information on the parents to determine work schedules, family background, mental disorders, child’s mental or medical heath issues, educational needs and and general customs and practices of the parents and make a determination based on her feelings.

 In making an overall determination, a guardian ad litem is able to look into specific cases in a way that an Divorce Judge never could - visit the families in their homes, visit the children in the schools, etc , however this " investigation" could cost the parties thousands of dollars that could be spent on the child’s braces or college fund instead. 

Make no mistake about it your ex-spouse’s attorney hired the GAL that previously “determined” cases based his or her value system that happens to be in alignment with the agenda or value system as your ex be it Catholic vs Protestant, home school vs public school, sports vs academic, disciplinarian vs time out, mediation vs final decision maker, etc.

 His attorney might have hired the GAL in an effort to win the war of attrition resulting in the less monied parent giving up. 

Generally, a Georgia Divorce & Family Law Judge will take into account the suggestions of the Guardian Ad Litem and will weigh their investigation and determination very seriously in making a judgment. No judge is ever bound by the findings of a guardian ad litem, but generally, a  guardian ad litem, appointed by the court,  can gain a unique "perspective" on a family’s inner-dynamics, and a judge in all likelihood will take that information into account very seriously and rule as the GAL suggest 80% of the time. 

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Email comments to jointphysical@yahoo.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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You should know that the only reason the Court has appointed a GAL is that you and your ex can not agree on the who should have custody of your child. This gives the SYSTEM THIEVES  a perfect excuse to bilk you and your ex out of thousands. The GAL is only interested in escalating her fees and does not care what your child wants. The only way to get rid of this parasite is to remove the disagreement between the parties.  

This might mean that you have to drop your counterclaim. The Court does not like to change custody unless a material chaetermine the "best interest of the child". If you drop your counterclaim and amend your answer to show that no change has occurred or that the other parent refused to work with you in good faith to resolve the issue you have a great chance of retaining custody  because the burden of proving a change occurred is on the Plaintiff.  

If a real change has taken place and you want more visitation or custody the other parent should make a good faith effort to resolve your issues before a GAL is appointed. If you  are the Plaintiff and a GAL has been appointed and the Judge will not vacate the order to appoint simply withdraw your complaint without prejudice. You can then schedule and attend mediation without paying the $200 per hour to the GAL. Why pay the mediator $200 per hour and the GAL $200 per hour?

 

 

 

MINNESOTA RULES OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROCEDURE 

Removal or Suspension of Guardian Ad Litem From Particular Case

            Subd. 1.  A guardian ad litem appointed to serve in a particular case may be removed or suspended from the case only by order of the presiding judge.  Removal or suspension may be upon initiation of the presiding judge or after hearing upon the motion of a party pursuant to subd. 2 of this Rule.

Subd. 2.   A party to the case who wishes to seek the removal or suspension of a guardian ad litem for cause must proceed by written motion before the judge presiding over the case.  A motion to remove or suspend a guardian ad litem for cause shall be served upon the parties and the guardian ad litem and filed.

 

 

Sample Motion for emergency hearing

In Washington a GAL can be fired for the following reasons:

1. Violated the Rules of Professional Conduct; 2. Misrepresented his or her qualifications to serve as a guardian ad litem; 3. Not met the annual training requirements set forth in the Registry requirements; 4. Breached the confidentiality of the parties; 5. Falsified information in a report to the Court or in testimony before the Court; 6. Failed to report abuse of a child; 7. Communicated with the a judge/commissioner ex-parte, except as allowed by (such as an emergency restraining order); 8. Purported to represent the Court in a public form without prior approval of the Presiding Judge; 9. Violated state or local laws, rules, or this policy in the person’s capacity as guardian ad litem; 10. Taken or failed to take any other action which would reasonably place the suitability of the person to serve as guardian ad litem in question; 11. Failed to keep information confidential from non- parties or disclosed protected information to a party; 12. Intentionally lied or presented information in a false light to the Court, another party or a third party; 13. Failed to report abuse of a child as required by RCW 26.44; 14. Talked about a case for which the guardian ad litem was appointed to the media or public without the permission of all parties and/or the Court

Guardian ad litem — Ex parte communications — Removal.

A guardian ad litem or court-appointed special advocate shall not engage in ex parte communications with any judicial officer involved in the matter for which he or she is appointed during the pendency of the proceeding, except as permitted by court rule or statute for ex parte motions. Ex parte motions shall be heard in open court on the record. The record may be preserved in a manner deemed appropriate by the county where the matter is heard. The court, upon its own motion, or upon the motion of a party, may consider the removal of any guardian ad litem or court-appointed special advocate who violates this section from any pending case or from any court-authorized registry, and if so removed may require forfeiture of any fees for professional services on the pending case.

 

 

 

 

Case from California

*Due to the differences in formatting between conventional word processors and the language of the Internet, HTML, formatting of the original brief has been slightly changed, so that the brief will be comprehensible in the various Internet browsers. The names of the clients in this brief have been replaced by the descriptors "CLIENT ..."

 

No. 98-375 In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997

CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, an Incompetent Person,
by her Permanent Conservator, and Guardian ad Litem,
CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER; and CLIENT DAUGHTER, a minor,
by CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, her Guardian ad Litem

Petitioners

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

 

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

 

LAW FIRM
R. Wayne Patterson
Attorneys for Petitioners

 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

 

Through counsel, plaintiffs' Guardian ad litem rejected defendant United States of America's settlement offer which was to be effected by the purchase of an annuity. Based on this rejection, on motion of the United States Attorney, the District Court removed the Guardian ad litem and his counsel, and appointed pro bono replacements, who promptly accepted the previously rejected offer of defendant United States of America. The questions presented here are:

1. Does a duly appointed Guardian ad litem have standing to seek review of the order of his removal and that of his counsel?

2. Does an attorney's fees agreement, calling for fees authorized by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and of the form authorized by the California Rules of Professional Conduct, constitute any conflict of interest?

3. Does a party have standing, to bring a motion to remove an adversary's Guardian ad litem, on the alleged basis, that said Guardian is not acting in the best interests of the adversary?

4. Does a party have standing, to bring a motion to remove counsel for an adversary's Guardian ad litem, on the alleged basis, that said counsel is not acting in the best interests of the adversary?

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5. May the alleged acts, omissions or statements of counsel for a Guardian ad litem, made during settlement discussions, constitute a basis for removal of either the Guardian or the Guardian's counsel?

6. May a Guardian ad litem, or his counsel, be removed solely upon the hearsay declaration of opposing counsel (in this case, an Assistant United States Attorney), as to the alleged acts, omissions and assertions of the Guardian's counsel during settlement discussions?

7. May the statement of counsel for a Guardian ad litem, during settlement discussions, to the effect that any settlement must take into account attorney's fees, constitute a basis for removal of either the Guardian or his counsel?

8. Is an annuity, issued by a private insurer, with no guarantee that the issuing insurer will remain solvent, a necessary component of a settlement structured to provide long-term care for an incompetent plaintiff?

9. May the refusal of a Guardian ad litem to consider settlement based upon an annuity, issued by a private insurer, with no guarantee that the issuing insurer will remain solvent, constitute a basis for removal of the Guardian or the Guardian's counsel?

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................................................................................................................ i
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .................................................................................................................1
OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................................................................1
JURISDICTION.......................................................................................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................................................................3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................................................................................................................7
I. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Denies Any Meaningful Appellate Review Of A Settlement Entered Into By
A Guardian Ad Litem On Behalf of An Incompetent or Infant ........................................................................................7
II. District Court's Removal Has A Chilling Effect On The American Legal System And Is In Violation
Of Both Federal Rules Of Evidence And Its Own Rule ..................................................................................................9
III. Alleged Acts, Omissions And Statements Of Counsel During Settlement Discussions .............................................11
IV. Even If Acts, Omissions And Statements Made During Settlement Discussions WereAdmissible,
District Court Abused Its Discretion, Because No Basis To Conclude That Said Acts,
Omissions And Statements Of Counsel Evince Irreconcilable Conflict Of Interest .........................................................16
A. Refusal To Consider Settlement In Form Of Annuity Does Not Evince Conflict Of Interest ......................................16
B. Consideration Of Attorney's Fees In Evaluation of Settlement Offer Does Not Evince Conflict Of Interest................ 20
V. Rationale Of District Court Violates Federal And State Law ....................................................................................23

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VI.
Petitioners Have Been Deprived Of Their Right To Appellate Review of The District Court's Ruling .........................25
VII. No Settlement Distribution To Be Undone If Reversed ..........................................................................................26
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................................27
NOTICE OF RELATED APPELLATE CASE ............................................................................................................31

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

 

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. The Wilderness Society (1975) 21 U.S. 240 ................................................22
Amchem Products, Inc. v Windsor (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct. 2231 ...................................................................23
Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California
(1993) 508 U.S. 602................................................8
Forney v. Apfel (1998) ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1984 ................................................................................................25
Gedders v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 80 .............................................................................................................10
Hull by Hull v United States (10th Cir 1992) 971 F2d 1499, cert den'd 507 US 1030 ...............................................18
Key Tronic v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 809 .......................................................................................................21
Linebarger v U.S. (N.D. Cal 1996) 927 F Supp 1280 ..................................................................................................17
Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp. (1997) 109 F3d 338 ......................................................................................................23
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v Rambo (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct. 1953, 138 L.Ed. 327 .......................................18
Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75 ...............................................................................................................................9
Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v.
Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters And Joiners of America
(1982) 456 U.S. 717 .................................22


Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ...........................................................................................................................................................25
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ........................................................................................................................................................5
28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq .................................................................................................................................................5
28 U.S.C. §1254(1) .........................................................................................................................................................2
33 USC §§ 914(a),(b) ....................................................................................................................................................18
42 U.S.C. §1396 et seq ..................................................................................................................................................27


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Federal Rules Of Evidence

 

Rule 408 ................................................................................................................................................................10, 11

Local Rules of The United States District Court, Central District Of California

Rule 23.9 ...............................................................................................................................................................10, 11

California Statutes

California Welfare & Institutions Code, § 14000 et seq ...........................................................................................27


California Code of Regulations

Title 22 .......................................................................................................................................................................27

vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

 

Petitioners CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 8, 1998, which judgment chills the right of advocacy to seek redress for injuries suffered by civil plaintiffs. Although defendant United States of America is the beneficiary of this particular instance of denial of Due Process, the action of the District Court strikes at all civil plaintiffs, whether or not the United States of America is defendant.

OPINIONS BELOW

The April 8, 1998, memorandum opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that gives rise to this petition was unpublished by order of the Ninth Circuit. It is reprinted in Appendix A hereto. The May 20, 1998, order of the Ninth Circuit denying petitioners' petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc is reprinted in Appendix B hereto. The August 12, 1996, order of the Ninth Circuit, denying petitioners petition for Writ of Mandamus to review the issues presented herein, is reprinted in Appendix C hereto. The March 24, 1997, order of the United States District Court for 1

 

the Central District of California, dismissing the action below pursuant to stipulation, is reprinted in Appendix D hereto. The September 12, 1996, order of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, appointing pro bonoGuardian ad litem and counsel for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER, is reprinted in Appendix E hereto. The August 2, 1996, order of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, removing CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER as Guardian ad litem and LAW FIRM as counsel for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER, is reprinted in Appendix F hereto.

 

JURISDICTION

On April 8, 1998, the Ninth Circuit dismissed petitioners' appeal from the judgment of the District Court for "lack of standing." The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on that date. On May 20, 1998, the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing and petitioners' suggestion that rehearing be conducted en banc. The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). By its August 12, 1996, order, the Ninth Circuit previously denied extraordinary relief to review the issues presented herein.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

 

Both the Guardian ad litem (husband and father of plaintiffs) and counsel, for petitioners, plaintiffs below, CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER1 and CLIENT DAUGHTER2, were removed, because the District Court, Honorable Terry J. Hatter, Judge of the United States District Court, presiding, concluded that counsel's statutory contingency fee agreement3 with the Guardian ad litem, created for counsel and Guardian ad litem an irreconcilable conflict of interest with petitioners. Judge Hatter replaced counsel and Guardian ad litem with two attorneys appointed to act pro bono. These replacement representatives, without consulting any relative or representative of petitioners, acceded to the offer of settlement by defendant United States of America, the identical offer rejected by the original counsel and Guardian ad litem as wholly inadequate, _____________________
1comatose due to admitted negligence of defendant United States of America
2newborn daughter of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, whose birth occurred moments before the admitted negligence of health care providers, employed by defendant United States of America.
3pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2678, form of the agreement was customary in the profession, as approved by the State Bar of California, and consistent with the American rule for attorney's fees

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given the severity of the damages suffered by petitioners. Contrary to the representations of the Assistant United States Attorney, that she was interested in seeing that the mother, CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, had funds for her support so long as she should live, the "settlement" provided no money to either petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, the comatose mother, or her estate, leaving the entire cost and burden of her care to the State of California.

The original Guardian ad litem, represented by the original counsel, brought an appeal on behalf of petitioners, challenging his removal and that of his counsel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding, that "A plaintiff may not 'appeal from a joint stipulation to voluntary dismissal, entered unconditionally by the court pursuant to a settlement agreement.'" Following is the chronology of this case in the courts below.

On November 4, 1994, plaintiff and petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, then 20 years of age, gave birth to a healthy baby girl, plaintiff and petitioner CLIENT DAUGHTER, at the United States Naval Hospital in 29 Palms, California. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of attending physicians, employees of defendant United States of America, at the Naval Hospital, CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER was allowed to uncontrollably hemorrhage, lost consciousness, has not regained

 

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consciousness, and remains comatose. She is unable to care for herself or give her husband and daughter the care and comfort to which they are entitled. Cpl. CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, United States Marine Corps, husband of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and father of CLIENT DAUGHTER, was appointed Conservator of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and Guardian ad litem for CLIENT DAUGHTER in California state courts. For simplicity, he will be referred to as Guardian ad litem for both. The requisite administrative claims were filed and denied and a lawsuit was instituted.

Petitioners' complaint against defendant United States of America for medical malpractice, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq, was filed on September 29, 1995, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The District Court assumed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346(b).

On July 1, 1996, a voluntary settlement conference was conducted by the Honorable David V. Kenyon, Judge of the Federal District Court. Following the voluntary settlement conference, the United States Attorney noticed a motion for July 29, 1996, requesting that both the Guardian ad litem and counsel for petitioners, be removed, the sole basis being hearsay declarations of Julie Zatz, Assistant United States Attorney, as to the alleged acts, omissions and assertions of counsel for the

 

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Guardian ad litem at the voluntary settlement conference. Section III below reprises the entirety of the alleged "misconduct" set out in the motion of respondent United States of America. Although petitioners dispute the accuracy of these hearsay declarations, they may be summarized as (1) the Guardian ad litem and counsel for said Guardian, refused to accept a settlement based on an annuity issued by a private insurer, and (2) counsel for said Guardian asserted his interest in attorney's fees as a consideration as to the amount that petitioners required to settle. The motion was granted by Honorable Terry J. Hatter, Judge of the United States District Court, and on August 2, 1996, Judge Hatter entered his order removing the original counsel and Guardian ad litem.

On September 12, 1996, replacement counsel and Guardian ad litem were appointed by the District Court to act on a pro bono basis.

On October 22, 1996, defendant United States of America filed a Notice of Admission of Liability.

On February 20, 1997, the pro bono replacement counsel and Guardian ad litem, without consulting any relative or representative of petitioners, entered into a stipulation for a purported settlement with defendant United States of America, on

 

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the identical terms rejected by the original counsel and Guardian ad litem. That "settlement" provided no compensation to either petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, the comatose wife and mother, or her estate, leaving the entire cost and burden of her care to the State of California. On March 24, 1997, the Order of Dismissal pursuant to that settlement was entered.

On April 7, 1997, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, still duly appointed Conservator and Guardian ad litem for petitioners, filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

 

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Denies Any Meaningful Appellate Review Of A Settlement Entered Into By A Guardian Ad Litem On Behalf of An Incompetent or Infant


At all times mentioned herein, petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER was comatose, unable to communicate with her Guardian ad litem. At all times mentioned herein, petitioner CLIENT DAUGHTERwas an infant, no more than four years old. If, as the Ninth Circuit has ruled, any settlement entered into on behalf of such incompetents, is not subject to appellate

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review, because it was "voluntarily entered into," then the appointed representative for any such incompetent is conclusively presumed to be competent and to have acted properly. The mere statement of such proposition demonstrates its absurdity. Such a holding presents a finite probability that inadequate settlements, if not actual mischief, will be perpetrated on such incompetent parties.

At the very least, the District Court's appointment of pro bono counsel who acceded to the patently inadequate settlement offer of respondent United States of America, has the appearance of collusion among those three entities.

"[J]ustice," indeed, "must satisfy the appearance of justice, and this stringent rule may sometimes bar trial [even] by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. [1980] 446 U.S.[ 238], at 243, 100 S.Ct., at 1613. Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California (1993) 508 U.S. 602, 618

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II. District Court's Removal Has A Chilling Effect On The American Legal System And Is In Violation Of Both Federal Rules Of Evidence And Its Own Rule

 


There is a valid reason for keeping confidential all settlement discussions. If such discussions were to be subject to future use in the same litigation, then no Guardian ad litem or counsel would discuss settlement options frankly. This would chill the possibility of settlement in virtually all cases, and frustrate the courts of this country by requiring far more trials than are currently conducted. Although this maxim requires but few words to state, and does not require hyperbole, the chill imposed on vigorous advocacy by the action of the District Court has the temperature of a howling snowstorm.
This Court has consistently upheld the right to vigorous advocacy:

[T]he need for forceful and vigorous advocacy to ensure that rights are not forgone and that substantial legal and factual arguments are not passed over is of paramount importance in our adversary system of justice, whether at the trial or the appellate stage. Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 76.

If our adversary system is to function according to design, we must assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal system, as well as to his client. I find it difficult to conceive of any circumstances that

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would justify a court's limiting the attorney's opportunity to serve his client because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating accepted ethical standards. Gedders v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 80, 93 (Justice Marshall concurring, joined by Justice Brennan)

 

Federal Rule of Evidence 408, dictates that "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in settlement discussions" "is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." By considering hearsay of the voluntary settlement conference, the District Court violated FRE 408 by using the hearsay acts, omissions and statements of counsel for the Guardian ad litem, to convince itself that petitioners' refusal to accept settlement in the form of an annuity issued by a private insurer, rendered petitioners' claim invalid.

Even more restrictive than FRE 408, Rule 23.9 of the Local Rules of The United States District Court, Central District Of California, dictates:

All settlement proceedings shall be confidential and no statement made therein shall be admissible in any proceeding in the case, unless the parties otherwise agree.

Similar to the proscription of the First Amendment, so often invoked by Justice Black, that "Congress shall make no law .

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. . .," Rule 23.9 permits no exception to the proscription that there shall be no involuntary use of any statement made during settlement discussions. By using the hearsay declaration of the Assistant United States Attorney. Ms. Zatz, as to statements of counsel for the Guardian ad litem, allegedly made in settlement discussions, for the purpose of removing the Guardian ad litem and his counsel, the District Court egregiously violated its own rule---a rule that is deeply rooted in the sound public policy to encourage the settlement of legal disputes.

By violating both FRE 408 and Local Rule 23.9, the District Court created a glacial chill on the effectiveness of legal advocacy in this country. Even though the Ninth Circuit's memorandum opinion is not published, make no mistake that every Assistant United States Attorney in the Central District of California, if not the entire country, has been advised of Ms. Zatz' successful tactic, and this blatant tactic will be repeated in the future, unless there is judicial review of this egregious tactic of the United States Attorney, countenanced and ratified by the District Court.

III. Alleged Acts, Omissions And Statements Of Counsel During Settlement Discussions

Following are the entirety of the hearsay references in the Motion [of defendant United States of America] for Appointment of Attorney/Guardian for Plaintiffs CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER (hereinafter,

 

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"Removal Motion") as to the acts, omissions and statements of counsel for the Guardian ad litem, which statements purportedly evince conflicts of interest among the Guardian ad litem, the Guardian's counsel and petitioners:

It has become abundantly clear that plaintiff CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, as an individual, has an irreconcilable conflict of interest in his representation of his wife CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and daughter CLIENT DAUGHTER. This conflict arises because, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER is interested in a recovery, the dominant feature of which is a lump sum of money payable to him in both his individual and representative capacities, while CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's lifetime medical care needs and her daughter CLIENT DAUGHTER's future needs may be better served by a medical trust and annuity which would guarantee that CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's medical needs will be provided and the costs paid for the duration of her life. Through his retained counsel, Lawyer, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER has repeatedly stated that his interest is in a cash settlement which may or may not prove adequate to meet CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's medical needs for the rest of her life. (Removal Motion, page 3, lines 13-25, hereinafter, "3:13-25").

Through counsel, the parties had several conversations regarding settlement. For the purpose of these discussions, the United States has accepted in its near entirety, plaintiffs' rehabilitationist/lifecare expert's

12

 

 

testimony regarding the nature, extent and costs of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's future medical care. Moreover, despite disagreement with plaintiffs concerning CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's ultimate life expectancy, defense counsel has informed plaintiffs' counsel, that she was prepared to recommend a settlement that would provide for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's medical care for the rest of her life, no matter how long that might be. During these discussions, Lawyer expressed concern that the cost of such a plan, and the "upfront" cash to fund the plan, was somehow not sufficient for his analysis or to fund his anticipated attorney's fees. Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶5. (Removal Motion, 4:25- 5:11)
On July 1, 1996, a settlement conference of approximately 35 minute duration was held in this matter before the Honorable David V. Kenyon. [Declaration of Julie Zatz] at ¶¶2,6. During this entire conference, Lawyer failed to inquire as to what type of settlement counsel was prepared to recommend. Lawyer again insisted that a settlement along the lines described above would not present a high enough "upfront" cost to the United States to fund his fees. [Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶6. In response to Judge Kenyon's comments to the effect that he may have a conflict of interest, Lawyer asserted that he was entitled to be concerned about his attorneys' fees. [Declaration of Julie Zatz] at ¶7. [FN 1] (Removal Motion, 5:12-22)

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FN 1: Under the FTCA, counsel may be entitled to as much as twenty five per cent of any judgment or settlement. 28 U.S.C. § 2678. Accordingly, Lawyer's apparent interest in increasing the "upfront" cost of any settlement is to increase his ultimate fee. (Removal Motion, 5:n1)

During the course of the settlement conference, Judge Kenyon expressed concerns about CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's life expectancy and the impact certain types of settlements may have on CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's longevity and financial security. In response, Lawyer stated that he would not counsel CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER to interfere with his wife's life expectancy. However, he agreed that a lump sum payment could result in CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER running out of money to pay for her long term medical costs should she live beyond plaintiffs' expert's projected life expectancy. Lawyer stated that was simply a risk she would have to take. [Declaration of Julie Zatz] at ¶8. (Removal Motion, 6:1-10)

. . . .CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, through Lawyer, has repeatedly shown his refusal to act in his wife and daughter's best interest. For example, CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER has hired the same attorney (Lawyer) to represent him in his personal capacity, as well as in his representative capacity. Therefore, the type of recovery (or settlement) that is in the optimum interests of the parties is, or can be, in direct conflict — which has already been manifest in this case.

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This severe and irreconcilable conflict of interest has been exemplified through Lawyer's conduct of the settlement negotiations. During the settlement conference and prior thereto, Lawyer has declined to discuss defendant's proposal that would ensure CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER receive continued treatment and care for the rest of her life, however long that time may be. Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶6. Instead, Mr. Friedman insists on a lump sum payment and had candidly admitted that payment of a large sum is necessary to ensure payment of his attorney's fees and that, in the future, these funds could run out, leaving CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER destitute. [Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶6.] (Removal Motion, 11:10-12:2]

Additionally, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER has a conflict of interest with CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER because all three parties are competing for limited settlement funds. (Emphasis Added) (Removal Motion, 12:3-5)

The foregoing is the entirety of the "evidence" and argument upon which defendant United States of America based its assertion that plaintiffs had an irreconcilable conflict of interest with their Guardian ad litem and the Guardian's counsel.

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IV. Even If Acts, Omissions And Statements Made During Settlement Discussions Were Admissible, District Court Abused Its Discretion, Because No Basis To Conclude That Said Acts, Omissions And Statements Of Counsel Evince Irreconcilable Conflict Of Interest

 

Assuming arguendo, that Judge Hatter properly entertained the hearsay recitation of the Assistant United States Attorney, Ms. Zatz, as to the acts, omissions and statements of counsel for the Guardian ad litem, the articulated conduct does not evince a conflict of interest between petitioners and either Guardian ad litem or his counsel. There is no evidentiary basis for Judge Hatter's removal of the original Guardian ad litem and counsel. Ms. Zatz' hearsay recitations can be reduced to two complaints, (1) that petitioners refused to consider settlement in the form of an annuity, and (2) that petitioners had to consider their liability for attorney's fees in determining whether to settle or go to trial.

A. Refusal To Consider Settlement In Form Of Annuity Does Not Evince Conflict Of Interest

First, as to the complaint that the Guardian ad litem and his counsel refused to consider settlement in the form of an annuity issued by a private insurer: Contrary to the contention of the United States Attorney, the refusal of the counsel and Guardian ad

16

 

litem to accept settlement in the form of a privately issued annuity, was in the best interests of petitioners, who would be greatly prejudiced if their future care was decimated by the failure of the private insurer. When defendant United States of America proposed settlement with petitioners based on the purchase of an annuity, it knew full well, the reality of annuities---issuers of annuities, usually insurance companies, can, and do, declare bankruptcy, leaving their obligees devastated. This reality has recently been articulated in Linebarger v U.S. (N.D. Cal 1996) 927 F Supp 1280, in which defendant United States of America, under the terms of a settlement agreement, was permitted to purchase an annuity from a private insurer to acquit its obligations to Linebarger. The insurer from which the annuity was purchased, declared bankruptcy. Linebarger moved the District Court to compel defendant United States of America to pay him the monies that he expected under the terms of the annuity. Defendant United States of America opposed the motion.

The Linebarger court denied the motion, holding that defendant United States of America could only enter into a lump-sum settlement under the FTCA, and its obligation ended once the lump sum payment to the issuer of the annuity was made. This was precisely the risk faced by petitioners herein, in considering the not guaranteed annuity offer.

 

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Linebarger, cited Hull by Hull v United States (10th Cir 1992) 971 F2d 1499, 1505, cert den'd 507 US 1030, the primary case relied upon by defendant United States of America, for the proposition that the United States of America cannot settle FTCA cases other than by lump-sum payments. As Congress has provided for periodic payments in other statutes which provide compensation for injuries, e.g., The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 USC §§ 914(a),(b), Congress could have provided for periodic payments in the FTCA, but chose not to do so. See, Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v Rambo (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct. 1953, 1960n4; 138 L.Ed. 327.

The Linebarger case, however, illustrates a much more important point: It is not so much what type of payment that defendant United States of America can make, but rather, there is no authority compelling a plaintiff to accept an annuity, or any type of payment other than a lump-sum award or settlement.

 

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Despite the lesson of Linebarger, defendant United States of America asserted the following misleading clauses in its Removal Motion, that

 

(1) petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER: "may be better served by a medical trust and an annuity which would guarantee [payments] . . . for the duration of [CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's] life." (Emphasis added) (Removal Motion, 3:19-22)

(2) the Assistant United States Attorney "was prepared to recommend a settlement that would provide for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's medical care for the rest of her life, no matter how long that might be." (Removal Motion, 5:5-7)

(3) respondent United States of America had made a "proposal that would ensure CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER receive continued treatment and care for the rest of her life, however long that time may be." (Removal Motion, 11:21-23)

Not only were these statements misleading, but they were disingenuous, because the ultimate "settlement" provided no compensation to the comatose mother, petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, transferring the entirety of the responsibility for her care and treatment to the State of California. Despite the plaintive tone of the Assistant United States Attorney that the counsel and Guardian ad litem did not have the best interests of petitioners at heart, where in the "settlement" did respondent United States provide the "lifetime" support that its Assistant United States Attorney promised in her papers?

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Lest there be a tendency to ascribe inadvertence to this repetition of misleading clauses, one need only look to the above cited misrepresentation of the Assistant United States Attorney, that respondent United States of America has "limited settlement funds." (Removal Motion, 12:3-5)

Defendant United States of America presented no evidence, in fact, there could be no such evidence, that an annuity would guarantee periodic payments for the duration of the needs of petitioners. Despite any evidence that purchase of an annuity would guarantee periodic payments for the duration of the needs of petitioners, Judge Hatter obviously concluded without evidentiary basis that defendant United States of America had offered settlement that guaranteed periodic payments for the duration of the needs of petitioners. It was an abuse of discretion for Judge Hatter to grant the Removal Motion based on this unfounded conclusion.

B. Consideration Of Attorney's Fees In Evaluation of Settlement Offer Does Not Evince Conflict Of Interest.

Second, as to the alleged statement of counsel for the Guardian, that his attorney's fees must be considered when deciding whether petitioners should settle: The alleged statement, if true, merely shows that said counsel was acting consistent

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with the American rule for attorney's fees, which this Court has consistently reaffirmed:

Under the longstanding "American rule," attorney's fees generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation absent explicit congressional authorization. Key Tronic v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 809, 809.

Even assuming that attorney's fees are necessary to achieve full compensation, this justification alone is not sufficient to create an exception to the American Rule in the absence of express congressional authority. See F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., supra, at 128-129, 94 S.Ct., at 2164- 2165. In F.D. Rich, this Court rejected the argument that attorney's fees should be awarded under the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793, as amended, 80 Stat. 1139, 40 U.S.C. S 270a et seq., because the Act provided for recovery of "sums justly due," 40 U.S.C. S 270b(a), and, unless fees were awarded, the legislative intent in favor of full compensation would be frustrated. 417 U.S., at 128, 94 S.Ct., at 2164. In squarely rejecting this claim, we found it to be nothing more than a "restate[ment] of one of the oft-repeated criticisms of the American Rule." Ibid. Although this Court acknowledged that "there is some force to the argument that a party who must bear the cost of his attorneys' fees out of his recovery is not made whole," we concluded that the countervailing considerations

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which support the American Rule argue against placing exclusive reliance on the need to provide full compensation. [Emphasis Added] Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters And Joiners of America (1982) 456 U.S. 717, 724

We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the 'American Rule' with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees. It has been criticized in recent years, [footnote omitted] and courts have been urged to find exceptions to it. [footnote omitted] It is also apparent from our national experience that the encouragement of private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desireable in a variety of circumstances. But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees has survived. It is deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals. [footnote omitted] Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. The Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S. 240, 270

The most recent affirmation by this Court that contingent attorney's fees agreements are the sine qua non of our system of advocacy was by Justice Ginsburg:

the interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call for denial of a class action. . . . The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to . . . provide the incentive . . . worth

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someone's (usually an attorney's) labor. (Emphasis added) Amchem Products, Inc. v Windsor (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2246, citing Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp. (1997) 109 F3d 338, 344

V. Rationale Of District Court Violates Federal And State Law

The District Court obviously based removal of both the Guardian ad litem and counsel on the fallacious proposition that an attorney with a contingent fees agreement with a client, has an irreconcilable conflict of interest with that client, notwithstanding that the attorney's fees are expressly authorized by the FTCA, the attorney's fees are consistent with the American rule for attorney's fees, and the form of the agreement conforms with The Rules Of Professional Conduct in California.

It is a serious matter when counsel is removed from representation against his will and that of his client. In this instance, Judge Hatter cavalierly ruled that counsel for the original Guardian ad litem, acted against the best interests of petitioners because said counsel comported himself consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2678, the American rule for attorney's fees, and the

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California Rules of Professional Conduct. Further, Judge Hatter's removal of a Guardian ad litem and Conservator, duly appointed by a state court and still in good standing with said state court, presents a justiciable friction between federal and state jurisdiction.

Although the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Local Rules of The United States District Court, Central District Of California, and case law, only some of which is cited above, demonstrate that Judge Hatter blatantly abused his discretion, all of this authority is merely affirmation of the Fifth Amendment mandate that "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

By removal of their Guardian ad litem and counsel, petitioners have been deprived of both the liberty to select their representatives, and property, a settlement meeting with the approval of the original Guardian ad litem and counsel, who have always had petitioners best interests in mind.

 

Judge Hatter has paternalistically decreed that it is in the best interests of petitioners that they settle for a non- guaranteed annuity (which was wholly inadequate), rather than have their claim decided by the process of trial. Interestingly, Judge Hatter did not require that comatose petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER receive an annuity, or any other form of compensation, when he approved the "settlement." By this egregious abuse of his discretion, he has shifted the entirety of the responsibility for

24

 

the care and treatment of comatose petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, from the culpably negligent respondent United States of America, to the State of California, since respondent United States of America has provided noannuity, or other form of compensation, to either petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER or to her estate.

As shown above, the contingent fees agreement is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2678, the American rule for attorney's fees and the California Rules of Professional Conduct. If the District Court is not reversed, litigants in that court, and many other courts, can anticipate similar rulings based on the court's fallacious perception.

 

VI. Petitioners Have Been Deprived Of Their Right To Appellate Review of The District Court's Ruling

28 U.S.C. § 12914 confers upon petitioners the right to appellate review of the removal of their Guardian ad litem and counsel for the Guardian. Forney v. Apfel (1998) ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1984

_____________________
4The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. . . .

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There has been no appellate review of the District Court's removal of the original Guardian ad litem and counsel. Petitioners' prior Petition for a Writ Of Mandamus, for review of the issues presented herein, was denied by the Ninth Circuit, on August 12, 1996, on the basis that the need for extraordinary relief had not been shown. By denial of the extraordinary writ, the Ninth Circuit decreed that an appeal does lie to review the issues herein, but it has violated its own decree, by its denial of appellate review of the issues presented herein.

If there can be no appellate review of the removal of a Guardian ad litem or counsel for such Guardian, then District Courts have unbridled discretion to remove Guardians ad litem or counsel with impunity. This means that a federal district court can dictate the course of litigation before it. At the very least, this presents the appearance of injustice.

 

VII. No Settlement Distribution To Be Undone If Reversed

Although defendant United States of America, may have purchased an annuity, petitioners have yet to receive any moneys as a result of the "settlement" below. Any payments to plaintiff CLIENT DAUGHTER are deferred until she reaches the age of majority; plaintiff CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER is maintained in her comatose state by funds provided by the

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California Medical Assistance Program
(Medi-Cal Act), California Welfare & Institutions Code, § 14000 et seq; Title 22, California Code of Regulations, the state program enacted pursuant to the federal Medicaid Act (Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396 et seq) to provide health care services to recipients of public assistance and others. Therefore, reversal of Judge Hatter's removal of the original Guardian ad litem and counsel will not require accounting of monies already received.

 

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari to insure that parties such as petitioners have standing to raise the issues presented herein. If petitioners do not have standing to raise the issues presented herein, then there is a finite probability, not just a possibility, that injustice in a variety of forms, will be perpetrated against incompetent parties in the federal courts.

It is necessary that this court grant certiorari so that the chill placed upon the vigorous advocacy of civil cases in all federal courts of this nation, by Judge Hatter's cavalier removal of the original Guardian ad litem and counsel for petitioners, will not be perpetuated.

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Conventional wisdom is that over 95% of cases settle before trial. If an attorney must be guarded during settlement discussions, and cannot be open and frank, for fear of removal because of an alleged irreconcilable conflict with the client, there will be few, if any, meaningful settlement discussions, and a greater number of cases will go to trial, rather than settle. If the 95% of all cases that settle, is reduced by a mere 5%, to 90%, and petitioners submit that it will be reduced much further, the number of cases tried will DOUBLE. One does not have to be a mathematician or attorney, to realize that such an explosion of the number trials will paralyze the legal system as we know it.

Defendant United States of America has offered not a scintilla of evidence that Cpl. CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, United States Marine Corps, was anything other than a loving and caring husband and father, who had the best interests of his comatose wife and newborn daughter in mind at all times. It is a disgrace that this young man, having served in the armed forces of this country, was removed from such a respectable position, absent even a scintilla of evidence of conflict of interest.

 

Nor has said defendant United States of America produced a scintilla of evidence that counsel for the original Guardian ad litem, acted other than in the best interests of petitioners, his clients. It is not a mere incidence of the practice of law, when

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a court rules that an attorney is unfit to represent clients due to an irreconcilable conflict of interest, it is an event that cannot be satisfactorily explained to clients.

As a result of the joint conduct of the United States Attorney, the District Court and the two pro bono attorneys, at the very least, there is the appearance of collusion. The State of California has been forced to pay the entire cost of care and treatment of petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, rather than respondent United States of America, which has admitted liability for the negligent acts which rendered CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER comatose.

At the very least, this court should grant certiorari to remand this matter to the Ninth Circuit, affirming that petitioners, through their duly appointed Guardian ad litem, have standing to raise the issues presented herein, so that there will be appellate review of the District Court's removal.

In the alternative, petitioners request that the court grant certiorari to review all the issues presented herein, and consider transfer of the related appeal to this court, so that all issues be resolved before one forum.

Dated: August 21, 1998

Respectfully submitted,

 

Law Firm,
by:
R. Wayne Patterson
Attorneys for Petitioners
CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER

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NOTICE OF RELATED APPELLATE CASE

 

Petitioners believe that the Court would wish to be notified of the case of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, an Incompetent, by her Permanent Conservator, and Guardian ad Litem, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER; and CLIENT DAUGHTER, a minor, by CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, her Guardian ad Litem v. ROBERT K. HOLMES and MICHAEL A. SALAZAR, Ninth Circuit No. 98-55140.

In this related case, petitioners brought suit in California state court against the replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel, alleging legal malpractice, a state common law cause of action. The issues in that case are whether the replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel acted within the applicable standard of care when they accepted a wholly inadequate settlement without consulting with any relative or representative of petitioners, thus making these inadequately insured attorneys, insurers for the injustice that has been perpetrated upon petitioners by Judge Hatter's singular order or removal.

The replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel removed this related action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, on the basis of collateral estoppel. Although the case was originally assigned to the Honorable Steven V. Wilson, United States District Court Judge, Judge Hatter saw to it that it was transferred to his courtroom. Judge Hatter promptly denied petitioners timely motion to remand, without hearing.

In that related action, the replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel immediately brought a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) on the basis of collateral estoppel. That motion was granted by Judge Hatter, again without hearing. An appeal ensued. The matter has been briefed, and awaits hearing. The estimated date of such hearing is May 1999.

Dated: August 21, 1998

Respectfully submitted,

Law Firm,
by:
R. Wayne Patterson
Attorneys for Petitioners
CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER