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WARNING!
NOTHING ON THIS SITE IS MEANT TO BE LEGAL ADVICE! You should do your
homework, calm down, assess the situation, then and only then hire a
competent attorney to represent you. GWINNETT COUNTY DOES NOT LIKE PRO-SE
LITIGANTS!
The
Goal of this website is to Reduce litigation, Increase mediation
, Eliminate the Guardian Ad Litem from private custody
cases and Help facilitate workable joint physical and legal custody
arrangements so the child may benefit from the love, direction
and decision making capabilities of both parents.
FIRE
your Guardian Ad Litem now!
Get
Joint Custody now!
The
Guardians are usurping the authority of Judicial system. They will do an
investigation and present a report based on hearsay and their value system.
If a GAL is involved in your case, Your
case will be decided without regard to legal basis, case law, laws
governing your state, rules of evidence or proper court room procedure.
GUARANTEED!
The GAL
is
destroying your family, irreparably harming your child's relationship with
his parents, creating a
resentment among the parties that will last a lifetime and
robbing you and your EX
blind.
This is the money you were going to use to buy your child her braces, his
first car or send him to college.
Women
around the country are losing custody when they allege abuse that the GAL
does not believe. They know that only 5% of
households report abuse until divorce proceeding begin and the number
jumps to 50%.If
there are allegations of abuse please hire a
medical professional. Do not let a GAL diminish your
concerns. However,
make
false allegations and lose your child. Read this! If you have
been falsely accused read www.falseallegations.com
If
there are allegations of medical
neglect warn your ex, take your child to the doctor yourself for God’s sake but
never use a GAL as they are not guided by years of medical training or
training in child
psychology but rather emotion and agendas.
Their
investigations
are unguided and their decisions are arbitrary and capricious.
GAL
Court testimony is very sporadic and full of
hearsay to
mask the superficial nature of her investigation. They take their cues
from the “vibe” or “ feelings” of the parties and the Judge.
The Court
System in Atlanta was specifically designed to create turmoil,
acrimony and resentment between the parties. The system creates
resolutions and agreements between the parties that are intentionally
vague to insure future business for the system and remove billions
of dollars from hard working families least able to afford it.
LOCAL
COST OF GAL.
There
is no doubt in my mind that Judges and Attorneys could make agreements
that are so fair and comprehensive that the possibility of future conflict
is totally eliminated.
I know , I know. Your Ex- husband treated you like an object or
worse and your Ex-wife treated you like a paycheck or worse.
So
what ! Get over it! We
all have our horror stories but the truth is that you knew 50% of all
marriages end in divorce when you created your child so wake up and take
care of that child the way she deserves.
Truth:
Your child needs both of her parents!
You suck as a single parent.
Joint
Physical Custody is what she needs. Cooperate in good faith with your
ex until your child is 18. If you are the better or more responsible
parent help the other parent!
I know
the sound of your ex-spouse’s voice is like finger nails on a chalkboard
but your phone will send text messages and your computer will send email.
A small percentage of grown-ups in Gwinnett County arrange joint physical
and joint legal custody with no child support and you can too. This will
eliminate the system from your life forever.
Sample Marital Settlement
Agreement / Parenting plan.
Truth:
You are using child support as a weapon. Your child’s needs only
food, clothing, and shelter. The total cost of your child’s needs is
not $650 per month. The current guidelines are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. You both must
maintain a house with food, air conditioning /heat , electricity and water
so why are you charging her child support? You know in your heart it is
really get even support or adult support. When your child is with your
ex you can work a part time job if you want extra money. He might be
working over time or a part time job to give you child support. Give him
the break he deserves.
Truth:
You are using extracurricular activities to control your ex. You
are avoiding your responsibility to parent by enrolling your child in more
than one activity at a time. Your ex should have full consultation on
extracurricular activities and the right to withdraw from any activity due
to lack of interest, lack of money or as a result of her desire to spend
quality time with your child.
Truth:
You are using final decision making status as a weapon. Your child is
entitled to a decision that is the
result of a joint decision making process or mediation.
When you can’t reach a decision after 4 hours of mediation you or your
ex can be designated as final decision maker. This process insures that
the tough decisions are thoroughly researched and debated.
Just include this mediation clause in your agreement.
You Must !Move
back in to the school district so your child can ride the bus home to
either house according to a predetermined schedule.
Anticipate the stages
of child development and prepare in advance to cooperate in a manner
conducive to raising a mentally and physically well rounded child.
You Must ! Support each other in discipline,
restrictions, and expectations for school performance. Quit trying to win
your child with gifts and promises and commit to raising your child as
your child and not your friend. Your child must know the same environment
exist in both households.
Myth: When
couples cannot agree or cooperate about matters like how the children
should be raised, a
judge must decide according to “the best interest of the child.”
Fact:
It is not the business of government officials to supervise the
raising of other people’s children. The
entire point of a marriage and family is for mothers and fathers to
cooperate and compromise for the sake of children and provide an example
to those children of precisely these principles, without which no family
can operate. Allowing one
parent to surrender both
parents’ decision-making rights over the children to government
officials because of “disagreement” — without any infraction by the
other (who may “disagree” only about losing his or her children) —
negates the very principle of private family life and invites collusion
between the divorcing parent and state officials.
Judges and
civil servants are not disinterested. When we give government officials
the power to make decisions about the best interest of other people’s
children, it may well become the best interest of the officials. Allowing
them to control the private lives of citizens’ who have committed no
legal infraction simply by invoking “disagreement” gives them an
incentive to reward the parent that is being the most disagreeable. That
is precisely the reason for the runaway divorce epidemic.
Unfortunately, a recent development
in Georgia Divorce & Family Law is the appointment of Guardian Ad
Litem's to cases involving PRIVATE Child Custody. Essentially, a guardian
ad litem works with both parents as well as their divorce attorneys to
look out for the best interest of the children. In the past these GALs
were used to perform a vital function in
the juvenile court system representing abused or neglected children.
Now it has become more mainstream to appoint a GAL in a private custody
dispute if one or both or the parties request it. It can become a war of
he said she said, cross accusations and innuendos designed to discredit
the other parent in the eyes of the GAL and the only winner is the GAL
after you pay her fees.
Among the things a guardian
ad litem will look into are the background information on the parents to
determine work schedules, family background, mental disorders, child’s
mental or medical heath issues, educational needs and and general customs
and practices of the parents and make a determination based on her
feelings.
In making an overall determination, a guardian ad litem is able
to look into specific cases in a way that an Divorce Judge never could -
visit the families in their homes, visit the children in the schools, etc
, however this " investigation" could cost the parties thousands
of dollars that could be spent on the child’s braces or college fund
instead.
Make no mistake about it your ex-spouse’s attorney hired the GAL that
previously
“determined” cases based his or
her value system that happens to be in alignment with the agenda
or value system as your ex be it Catholic vs Protestant, home school vs
public school, sports vs academic, disciplinarian vs time out, mediation
vs final decision maker, etc.
His attorney might have
hired the GAL in an effort to win the war of attrition resulting in the
less monied parent giving up.
Generally, a Georgia Divorce & Family Law Judge will take into
account the suggestions of the Guardian Ad Litem and will weigh their
investigation and determination very seriously in making a judgment. No
judge is ever bound by the findings of a guardian ad litem, but generally,
a guardian ad litem, appointed by the court,
can gain a unique "perspective" on a family’s
inner-dynamics, and a judge in all likelihood will take that information
into account very seriously and rule as the GAL suggest 80% of the
time.
.
Email comments to jointphysical@yahoo.com
www.tajmyshack.com/
www.redlightripoff.com
www.boxtheoutsidethink.com
www.iwantapieceofthat.com
www.breakmeoffapiece.com
www.ibogatree.com
www.ibogatreeoflife.com
www.ibogaineaddictioncure.com
www.wealthcarespecialist.com
www.kalakapanalo.com
You should
know that the only reason the Court has appointed a GAL is that you and
your ex can not agree on the who should have custody of your child. This
gives the SYSTEM THIEVES
a perfect excuse to bilk you and your ex out of thousands. The GAL
is only interested in escalating her fees and does not care what your
child wants. The only way to get rid of this parasite is to remove the
disagreement between the parties.
This might mean that you have to drop your
counterclaim. The Court does not like to change custody unless a material
chaetermine the "best interest of
the child". If you drop your counterclaim and amend your answer to
show that no change has occurred or that the other parent refused to work
with you in good faith to resolve the issue you have a great chance of
retaining custody
because the burden of proving a change occurred is on the
Plaintiff.
If
a real change has taken place and you want more visitation or custody the
other parent should make a good faith effort to resolve your issues before
a GAL is appointed. If you
are the Plaintiff and a GAL has been appointed and the Judge will
not vacate the order to appoint simply withdraw your complaint without
prejudice. You can then schedule and attend mediation without paying the
$200 per hour to the GAL. Why pay the mediator $200 per hour and the GAL
$200 per hour?
MINNESOTA
RULES OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROCEDURE
Removal
or Suspension of Guardian Ad Litem From Particular Case
Subd. 1.
A guardian ad litem appointed to serve in a particular case may
be removed or suspended from the case only by order of the presiding
judge. Removal or suspension
may be upon initiation of the presiding judge or after hearing upon the
motion of a party pursuant to subd. 2 of this Rule.
Subd. 2. A
party to the case who wishes to seek the removal or suspension of a
guardian ad litem for cause must proceed by written motion before the
judge presiding over the case. A motion to remove or suspend a guardian ad litem for cause
shall be served upon the parties and the guardian ad litem and filed.
Sample
Motion for emergency hearing
In
Washington a GAL can be fired for the following reasons:
1.
Violated the Rules of Professional Conduct; 2. Misrepresented his or her
qualifications to serve as a guardian ad litem; 3. Not met the annual
training requirements set forth in the Registry requirements; 4. Breached
the confidentiality of the parties; 5. Falsified information in a report
to the Court or in testimony before the Court; 6. Failed to report abuse
of a child; 7. Communicated with the a judge/commissioner ex-parte, except
as allowed by (such as an emergency restraining order); 8. Purported to
represent the Court in a public form without prior approval of the
Presiding Judge; 9. Violated state or local laws, rules, or this policy in
the person’s capacity as guardian ad litem; 10. Taken or failed to take
any other action which would reasonably place the suitability of the
person to serve as guardian ad litem in question; 11. Failed to keep
information confidential from non- parties or disclosed protected
information to a party; 12. Intentionally lied or presented information in
a false light to the Court, another party or a third party; 13. Failed to
report abuse of a child as required by RCW 26.44; 14. Talked about a case
for which the guardian ad litem was appointed to the media or public
without the permission of all parties and/or the Court
Guardian
ad litem — Ex parte communications — Removal.
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A guardian ad
litem or court-appointed special advocate shall not engage in ex parte
communications with any judicial officer involved in the matter for which
he or she is appointed during the pendency of the proceeding, except as
permitted by court rule or statute for ex parte motions. Ex parte motions
shall be heard in open court on the record. The record may be preserved in
a manner deemed appropriate by the county where the matter is heard. The
court, upon its own motion, or upon the motion of a party, may consider
the removal of any guardian ad litem or court-appointed special advocate
who violates this section from any pending case or from any
court-authorized registry, and if so removed may require forfeiture of any
fees for professional services on the pending case.
Case from California
*Due to the differences in formatting between conventional word
processors and the language of the Internet, HTML, formatting of the
original brief has been slightly changed, so that the brief will be
comprehensible in the various Internet browsers. The names of the clients
in this brief have been replaced by the descriptors "CLIENT
..."

No. 98-375 In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997

CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, an Incompetent Person,
by her Permanent Conservator, and Guardian ad Litem,
CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER; and CLIENT
DAUGHTER, a minor,
by CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, her Guardian ad
Litem
Petitioners
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

LAW FIRM
R. Wayne Patterson
Attorneys for Petitioners

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Through counsel, plaintiffs' Guardian ad litem rejected defendant United
States of America's settlement offer which was to be effected by the
purchase of an annuity. Based on this rejection, on motion of the United
States Attorney, the District Court removed the Guardian ad litem and his
counsel, and appointed pro bono replacements, who promptly accepted the
previously rejected offer of defendant United States of America. The
questions presented here are:
1. Does a duly appointed Guardian ad litem have
standing to seek review of the order of his removal and that of
his counsel?
2. Does an attorney's fees agreement, calling for fees authorized by
the Federal Tort Claims Act, and of the form authorized by the California
Rules of Professional Conduct, constitute any conflict of interest?
3. Does a party have standing, to bring a motion to remove an
adversary's Guardian ad litem, on the alleged basis,
that said Guardian is not acting in the best interests of the adversary?
4. Does a party have standing, to bring a motion to remove counsel for
an adversary's Guardian ad litem, on the alleged
basis, that said counsel is not acting in the best interests of the
adversary?
i

5. May the alleged acts, omissions or statements of counsel for a
Guardian ad litem, made during settlement discussions, constitute a
basis for removal of either the Guardian or the Guardian's counsel?
6. May a Guardian ad litem, or his counsel, be
removed solely upon the hearsay declaration of opposing counsel (in this
case, an Assistant United States Attorney), as to the alleged acts,
omissions and assertions of the Guardian's counsel during settlement
discussions?
7. May the statement of counsel for a Guardian ad litem,
during settlement discussions, to the effect that any settlement must take
into account attorney's fees, constitute a basis for removal of either the
Guardian or his counsel?
8. Is an annuity, issued by a private insurer, with no guarantee that
the issuing insurer will remain solvent, a necessary component of a
settlement structured to provide long-term care for an incompetent
plaintiff?
9. May the refusal of a Guardian ad litem to
consider settlement based upon an annuity, issued by a private insurer,
with no guarantee that the issuing insurer will remain solvent, constitute
a basis for removal of the Guardian or the Guardian's counsel?
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED........................................................................................................................................
i
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
.................................................................................................................1
OPINIONS BELOW
...................................................................................................................................................1
JURISDICTION..........................................................................................................................................................
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
....................................................................................................................................3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
.................................................................................................................7
I. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Denies Any Meaningful Appellate
Review Of A Settlement Entered Into By
A Guardian Ad Litem On Behalf of An Incompetent or Infant
........................................................................................7
II. District Court's Removal Has A Chilling Effect On The American
Legal System And Is In Violation
Of Both Federal Rules Of Evidence And Its Own Rule
..................................................................................................9
III. Alleged Acts, Omissions And Statements Of Counsel During
Settlement Discussions .............................................11
IV. Even If Acts, Omissions And Statements Made During Settlement
Discussions WereAdmissible,
District Court Abused Its Discretion, Because No Basis To Conclude That
Said Acts,
Omissions And Statements Of Counsel Evince Irreconcilable Conflict Of
Interest .........................................................16
A. Refusal To Consider Settlement In Form Of Annuity Does Not Evince
Conflict Of Interest ......................................16
B. Consideration Of Attorney's Fees In Evaluation of Settlement Offer
Does Not Evince Conflict Of Interest................ 20
V. Rationale Of District Court Violates Federal And State Law
....................................................................................23
iii

VI. Petitioners Have Been Deprived Of Their Right To Appellate Review
of The District Court's Ruling .........................25
VII. No Settlement Distribution To Be Undone If Reversed
..........................................................................................26
CONCLUSION
..........................................................................................................................................................27
NOTICE OF RELATED APPELLATE CASE
............................................................................................................31
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. The Wilderness Society
(1975) 21 U.S. 240 ................................................22
Amchem Products, Inc. v Windsor (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct.
2231 ...................................................................23
Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California (1993)
508 U.S. 602................................................8
Forney v. Apfel (1998) ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1984
................................................................................................25
Gedders v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 80
.............................................................................................................10
Hull by Hull v United States (10th Cir 1992) 971 F2d 1499,
cert den'd 507 US 1030 ...............................................18
Key Tronic v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 809
.......................................................................................................21
Linebarger v U.S. (N.D. Cal 1996) 927 F Supp 1280
..................................................................................................17
Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp. (1997) 109 F3d 338
......................................................................................................23
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v Rambo (1997) ___ US ___, 117
S.Ct. 1953, 138 L.Ed. 327 .......................................18
Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75
...............................................................................................................................9
Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v.
Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters And Joiners of America
(1982) 456 U.S. 717 .................................22
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1291
...........................................................................................................................................................25
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
........................................................................................................................................................5
28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq
.................................................................................................................................................5
28 U.S.C. §1254(1)
.........................................................................................................................................................2
33 USC §§ 914(a),(b)
....................................................................................................................................................18
42 U.S.C. §1396 et seq
..................................................................................................................................................27
v

Federal Rules Of Evidence
Rule 408
................................................................................................................................................................10,
11
Local Rules of The United States District Court,
Central District Of California
Rule 23.9
...............................................................................................................................................................10,
11
California Statutes
California Welfare & Institutions Code, § 14000 et
seq
...........................................................................................27
California Code of Regulations
Title 22
.......................................................................................................................................................................27
vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT
DAUGHTER respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 8, 1998, which judgment chills
the right of advocacy to seek redress for injuries suffered by civil
plaintiffs. Although defendant United States of America is the beneficiary
of this particular instance of denial of Due Process, the action of the
District Court strikes at all civil plaintiffs, whether or not the United
States of America is defendant.
OPINIONS BELOW
The April 8, 1998, memorandum opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that gives rise to this petition was
unpublished by order of the Ninth Circuit. It is reprinted in Appendix A
hereto. The May 20, 1998, order of the Ninth Circuit denying petitioners'
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc is reprinted
in Appendix B hereto. The August 12, 1996, order of the Ninth Circuit,
denying petitioners petition for Writ of Mandamus to review the issues
presented herein, is reprinted in Appendix C hereto. The March 24, 1997,
order of the United States District Court for 1

the Central District of California, dismissing the action below pursuant
to stipulation, is reprinted in Appendix D hereto. The September 12, 1996,
order of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, appointing pro bonoGuardian ad litem and counsel for CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER, is
reprinted in Appendix E hereto. The August 2, 1996, order of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, removing CLIENT
HUSBAND/FATHER as Guardian ad litem and LAW
FIRM as counsel for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER
and CLIENT DAUGHTER, is reprinted in Appendix
F hereto.
JURISDICTION
On April 8, 1998, the Ninth Circuit dismissed petitioners' appeal from the
judgment of the District Court for "lack of standing." The Ninth
Circuit entered judgment on that date. On May 20, 1998, the Ninth Circuit
denied rehearing and petitioners' suggestion that rehearing be conducted
en banc. The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). By its August
12, 1996, order, the Ninth Circuit previously denied extraordinary relief
to review the issues presented herein.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Both the Guardian ad litem (husband and father of plaintiffs) and
counsel, for petitioners, plaintiffs below, CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER1 and CLIENT DAUGHTER2,
were removed, because the District Court, Honorable Terry J. Hatter, Judge
of the United States District Court, presiding, concluded that counsel's
statutory contingency fee agreement3 with the Guardian ad
litem, created for counsel and Guardian ad litem an
irreconcilable conflict of interest with petitioners. Judge Hatter
replaced counsel and Guardian ad litem with two attorneys appointed
to act pro bono. These replacement representatives, without
consulting any relative or representative of petitioners, acceded to the
offer of settlement by defendant United States of America, the identical
offer rejected by the original counsel and Guardian ad litem as wholly
inadequate, _____________________
1comatose due to admitted negligence of defendant United States
of America
2newborn daughter of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER,
whose birth occurred moments before the admitted negligence of health care
providers, employed by defendant United States of America.
3pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2678, form of the agreement was
customary in the profession, as approved by the State Bar of California,
and consistent with the American rule for attorney's fees
3

given the severity of the damages suffered by petitioners. Contrary to the
representations of the Assistant United States Attorney, that she was
interested in seeing that the mother, CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER, had funds for her support so long as she should live,
the "settlement" provided no money to either petitioner CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER, the comatose mother, or her estate, leaving the entire
cost and burden of her care to the State of California.
The original Guardian ad litem, represented by the original counsel,
brought an appeal on behalf of petitioners, challenging his removal and
that of his counsel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal, holding, that "A plaintiff may not 'appeal from a joint
stipulation to voluntary dismissal, entered unconditionally by the court
pursuant to a settlement agreement.'" Following is the chronology of
this case in the courts below.
On November 4, 1994, plaintiff and petitioner CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER, then 20 years of age, gave birth to a healthy baby
girl, plaintiff and petitioner CLIENT DAUGHTER,
at the United States Naval Hospital in 29 Palms, California. As a direct
and proximate result of the negligence of attending physicians, employees
of defendant United States of America, at the Naval Hospital, CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER was allowed to uncontrollably hemorrhage, lost
consciousness, has not regained
4

consciousness, and remains comatose. She is unable to care for herself or
give her husband and daughter the care and comfort to which they are
entitled. Cpl. CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, United
States Marine Corps, husband of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and
father of CLIENT DAUGHTER, was appointed
Conservator of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and
Guardian ad litem for CLIENT DAUGHTER in
California state courts. For simplicity, he will be referred to as
Guardian ad litem for both. The requisite administrative claims
were filed and denied and a lawsuit was instituted.
Petitioners' complaint against defendant United States of America for
medical malpractice, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"),
28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq, was filed on September 29, 1995, in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. The
District Court assumed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1346(b).
On July 1, 1996, a voluntary settlement conference was conducted by the
Honorable David V. Kenyon, Judge of the Federal District Court. Following
the voluntary settlement conference, the United States Attorney noticed a
motion for July 29, 1996, requesting that both the Guardian ad litem and
counsel for petitioners, be removed, the sole basis being hearsay
declarations of Julie Zatz, Assistant United States Attorney, as to the
alleged acts, omissions and assertions of counsel for the
5

Guardian ad litem at the voluntary settlement conference.
Section III below reprises the entirety of the alleged
"misconduct" set out in the motion of respondent United States
of America. Although petitioners dispute the accuracy of these hearsay
declarations, they may be summarized as (1) the Guardian ad litem
and counsel for said Guardian, refused to accept a settlement based on an
annuity issued by a private insurer, and (2) counsel for said Guardian
asserted his interest in attorney's fees as a consideration as to the
amount that petitioners required to settle. The motion was granted by
Honorable Terry J. Hatter, Judge of the United States District Court, and
on August 2, 1996, Judge Hatter entered his order removing the original
counsel and Guardian ad litem.
On September 12, 1996, replacement counsel and Guardian ad litem
were appointed by the District Court to act on a pro bono
basis.
On October 22, 1996, defendant United States of America filed a Notice of
Admission of Liability.
On February 20, 1997, the pro bono replacement counsel and
Guardian ad litem, without consulting any relative or
representative of petitioners, entered into a stipulation for a purported
settlement with defendant United States of America, on
6

the identical terms rejected by the original counsel and Guardian ad
litem. That "settlement" provided no compensation to either
petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, the comatose
wife and mother, or her estate, leaving the entire cost and burden of her
care to the State of California. On March 24, 1997, the Order of Dismissal
pursuant to that settlement was entered.
On April 7, 1997, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER,
still duly appointed Conservator and Guardian ad litem for
petitioners, filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Denies Any
Meaningful Appellate Review Of A Settlement Entered Into By A Guardian Ad
Litem On Behalf of An Incompetent or Infant
At all times mentioned herein, petitioner CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER was comatose, unable to communicate with her Guardian ad
litem. At all times mentioned herein, petitioner CLIENT
DAUGHTERwas an infant, no more than four years old. If, as the
Ninth Circuit has ruled, any settlement entered into on behalf of such
incompetents, is not subject to appellate
7

review, because it was "voluntarily entered into," then the
appointed representative for any such incompetent is conclusively presumed
to be competent and to have acted properly. The mere statement of such
proposition demonstrates its absurdity. Such a holding presents a finite
probability that inadequate settlements, if not actual mischief, will be
perpetrated on such incompetent parties.
At the very least, the District Court's appointment of pro bono
counsel who acceded to the patently inadequate settlement offer of
respondent United States of America, has the appearance of collusion among
those three entities.
"[J]ustice," indeed, "must satisfy the appearance of
justice, and this stringent rule may sometimes bar trial [even] by
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh
the scales of justice equally between contending parties." Marshall
v. Jerrico, Inc. [1980] 446 U.S.[ 238], at 243, 100 S.Ct., at 1613. Concrete
Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for Southern California (1993) 508 U.S. 602, 618
8

II. District Court's Removal Has A Chilling Effect On The American
Legal System And Is In Violation Of Both Federal Rules Of Evidence And Its
Own Rule
There is a valid reason for keeping confidential all settlement
discussions. If such discussions were to be subject to future use in the
same litigation, then no Guardian ad litem or counsel would discuss
settlement options frankly. This would chill the possibility of settlement
in virtually all cases, and frustrate the courts of this country by
requiring far more trials than are currently conducted. Although this
maxim requires but few words to state, and does not require hyperbole, the
chill imposed on vigorous advocacy by the action of the District Court has
the temperature of a howling snowstorm.
This Court has consistently upheld the right to vigorous advocacy:
[T]he need for forceful and vigorous advocacy to ensure that rights
are not forgone and that substantial legal and factual arguments are not
passed over is of paramount importance in our adversary system of
justice, whether at the trial or the appellate stage. Penson v.
Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 76.
If our adversary system is to function according to design, we must
assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal
system, as well as to his client. I find it difficult to conceive of any
circumstances that
9

would justify a court's limiting the attorney's opportunity to serve his
client because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating
accepted ethical standards. Gedders v. United States (1976)
425 U.S. 80, 93 (Justice Marshall concurring, joined by Justice Brennan)
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, dictates that "[e]vidence of
conduct or statements made in settlement discussions" "is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount." By considering hearsay of the voluntary settlement
conference, the District Court violated FRE 408 by using the
hearsay acts, omissions and statements of counsel for the Guardian ad
litem, to convince itself that petitioners' refusal to accept
settlement in the form of an annuity issued by a private insurer, rendered
petitioners' claim invalid.
Even more restrictive than FRE 408, Rule 23.9 of the Local
Rules of The United States District Court, Central District Of California,
dictates:
All settlement proceedings shall be confidential and no statement
made therein shall be admissible in any proceeding in the case, unless
the parties otherwise agree.
Similar to the proscription of the First Amendment, so often invoked by
Justice Black, that "Congress shall make no law .
10

. . .," Rule 23.9 permits no exception to the proscription
that there shall be no involuntary use of any statement made during
settlement discussions. By using the hearsay declaration of the Assistant
United States Attorney. Ms. Zatz, as to statements of counsel for the
Guardian ad litem, allegedly made in settlement discussions, for
the purpose of removing the Guardian ad litem and his counsel, the
District Court egregiously violated its own rule---a rule that is deeply
rooted in the sound public policy to encourage the settlement of legal
disputes.
By violating both FRE 408 and Local Rule 23.9, the District Court
created a glacial chill on the effectiveness of legal advocacy in this
country. Even though the Ninth Circuit's memorandum opinion is not
published, make no mistake that every Assistant United States Attorney in
the Central District of California, if not the entire country, has been
advised of Ms. Zatz' successful tactic, and this blatant tactic will be
repeated in the future, unless there is judicial review of this egregious
tactic of the United States Attorney, countenanced and ratified by the
District Court.
III. Alleged Acts, Omissions And Statements Of Counsel During
Settlement Discussions
Following are the entirety of the hearsay references in the Motion [of
defendant United States of America] for Appointment of Attorney/Guardian
for Plaintiffs CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT
DAUGHTER (hereinafter,
11

"Removal Motion") as to the acts, omissions and statements of
counsel for the Guardian ad litem, which statements purportedly
evince conflicts of interest among the Guardian ad litem, the
Guardian's counsel and petitioners:
It has become abundantly clear that plaintiff CLIENT
HUSBAND/FATHER, as an individual, has an irreconcilable conflict
of interest in his representation of his wife CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER and daughter CLIENT DAUGHTER.
This conflict arises because, CLIENT
HUSBAND/FATHER is interested in a recovery, the dominant feature
of which is a lump sum of money payable to him in both his individual
and representative capacities, while CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's
lifetime medical care needs and her daughter CLIENT
DAUGHTER's future needs may be better served by a medical trust
and annuity which would guarantee that CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER's medical needs will be provided and the costs paid
for the duration of her life. Through his retained counsel, Lawyer, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER has repeatedly stated
that his interest is in a cash settlement which may or may not prove
adequate to meet CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's
medical needs for the rest of her life. (Removal Motion, page 3, lines
13-25, hereinafter, "3:13-25").
Through counsel, the parties had several conversations regarding
settlement. For the purpose of these discussions, the United States has
accepted in its near entirety, plaintiffs' rehabilitationist/lifecare
expert's
12

testimony regarding the nature, extent and costs of CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER's future medical care. Moreover, despite disagreement
with plaintiffs concerning CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's
ultimate life expectancy, defense counsel has informed plaintiffs'
counsel, that she was prepared to recommend a settlement that would
provide for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's medical
care for the rest of her life, no matter how long that might be. During
these discussions, Lawyer expressed concern
that the cost of such a plan, and the "upfront" cash to fund
the plan, was somehow not sufficient for his analysis or to fund his
anticipated attorney's fees. Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶5. (Removal
Motion, 4:25- 5:11)
On July 1, 1996, a settlement conference of approximately 35 minute
duration was held in this matter before the Honorable David V. Kenyon.
[Declaration of Julie Zatz] at ¶¶2,6. During this entire conference, Lawyer failed to inquire as to what type of settlement counsel was
prepared to recommend. Lawyer again
insisted that a settlement along the lines described above would not
present a high enough "upfront" cost to the United States to
fund his fees. [Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶6. In response to Judge
Kenyon's comments to the effect that he may have a conflict of interest, Lawyer asserted that he was entitled to be
concerned about his attorneys' fees. [Declaration of Julie Zatz] at ¶7.
[FN 1] (Removal Motion, 5:12-22)
13

FN 1: Under the FTCA, counsel may be entitled to as much as twenty
five per cent of any judgment or settlement. 28 U.S.C. § 2678.
Accordingly, Lawyer's apparent interest in
increasing the "upfront" cost of any settlement is to increase
his ultimate fee. (Removal Motion, 5:n1)
During the course of the settlement conference, Judge Kenyon expressed
concerns about CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's life
expectancy and the impact certain types of settlements may have on CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER's longevity and financial security. In response, Lawyer stated that he would not counsel CLIENT
HUSBAND/FATHER to interfere with his wife's life expectancy.
However, he agreed that a lump sum payment could result in CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER running out of money to pay for her long term medical
costs should she live beyond plaintiffs' expert's projected life
expectancy. Lawyer stated that was simply a
risk she would have to take. [Declaration of Julie Zatz] at ¶8. (Removal
Motion, 6:1-10)
. . . .CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, through Lawyer,
has repeatedly shown his refusal to act in his wife and daughter's best
interest. For example, CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER has
hired the same attorney (Lawyer) to
represent him in his personal capacity, as well as in his representative
capacity. Therefore, the type of recovery (or settlement) that is in the
optimum interests of the parties is, or can be, in direct conflict —
which has already been manifest in this case.
14

This severe and irreconcilable conflict of interest has been
exemplified through Lawyer's conduct of the
settlement negotiations. During the settlement conference and prior
thereto, Lawyer has declined to discuss
defendant's proposal that would ensure CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER receive continued treatment and care for the rest of
her life, however long that time may be. Declaration of Julie
Zatz at ¶6. Instead, Mr. Friedman insists on a lump sum payment and had
candidly admitted that payment of a large sum is necessary to ensure
payment of his attorney's fees and that, in the future, these funds
could run out, leaving CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER destitute.
[Declaration of Julie Zatz at ¶6.] (Removal Motion, 11:10-12:2]
Additionally, CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER has a
conflict of interest with CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT DAUGHTER because all three parties
are competing for limited settlement funds. (Emphasis Added) (Removal
Motion, 12:3-5)
The foregoing is the entirety of the "evidence" and argument
upon which defendant United States of America based its assertion that
plaintiffs had an irreconcilable conflict of interest with their Guardian ad
litem and the Guardian's counsel.
15

IV. Even If Acts, Omissions And Statements Made During Settlement
Discussions Were Admissible, District Court Abused Its Discretion, Because
No Basis To Conclude That Said Acts, Omissions And Statements Of Counsel
Evince Irreconcilable Conflict Of Interest
Assuming arguendo, that Judge Hatter properly entertained
the hearsay recitation of the Assistant United States Attorney, Ms. Zatz,
as to the acts, omissions and statements of counsel for the Guardian ad
litem, the articulated conduct does not evince a conflict of interest
between petitioners and either Guardian ad litem or his counsel.
There is no evidentiary basis for Judge Hatter's removal of the original
Guardian ad litem and counsel. Ms. Zatz' hearsay recitations can be
reduced to two complaints, (1) that petitioners refused to consider
settlement in the form of an annuity, and (2) that petitioners had to
consider their liability for attorney's fees in determining whether to
settle or go to trial.
A. Refusal To Consider Settlement In Form Of Annuity Does Not
Evince Conflict Of Interest
First, as to the complaint that the Guardian ad litem and his
counsel refused to consider settlement in the form of an annuity issued by
a private insurer: Contrary to the contention of the United States
Attorney, the refusal of the counsel and Guardian ad
16

litem to accept settlement in the form of a privately issued
annuity, was in the best interests of petitioners, who would be greatly
prejudiced if their future care was decimated by the failure of the
private insurer. When defendant United States of America proposed
settlement with petitioners based on the purchase of an annuity, it knew
full well, the reality of annuities---issuers of annuities, usually
insurance companies, can, and do, declare bankruptcy, leaving their
obligees devastated. This reality has recently been articulated in Linebarger
v U.S. (N.D. Cal 1996) 927 F Supp 1280, in which defendant
United States of America, under the terms of a settlement agreement,
was permitted to purchase an annuity from a private insurer to acquit its
obligations to Linebarger. The insurer from which the annuity was
purchased, declared bankruptcy. Linebarger moved the District Court to
compel defendant United States of America to pay him the monies that he
expected under the terms of the annuity. Defendant United States of
America opposed the motion.
The Linebarger court denied the motion, holding that defendant United
States of America could only enter into a lump-sum settlement under the
FTCA, and its obligation ended once the lump sum payment to the issuer of
the annuity was made. This was precisely the risk faced by petitioners
herein, in considering the not guaranteed annuity offer.
17

Linebarger, cited Hull by Hull v United States
(10th Cir 1992) 971 F2d 1499, 1505, cert den'd 507 US 1030, the primary
case relied upon by defendant United States of America, for the
proposition that the United States of America cannot settle FTCA cases
other than by lump-sum payments. As Congress has provided for periodic
payments in other statutes which provide compensation for injuries, e.g., The
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 USC §§
914(a),(b), Congress could have provided for periodic payments in the FTCA,
but chose not to do so. See, Metropolitan Stevedore
Co. v Rambo (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct. 1953, 1960n4; 138 L.Ed.
327.
The Linebarger case, however, illustrates a much more
important point: It is not so much what type of payment that defendant
United States of America can make, but rather, there is no authority
compelling a plaintiff to accept an annuity, or any type of payment other
than a lump-sum award or settlement.
18

Despite the lesson of Linebarger, defendant United States of
America asserted the following misleading clauses in its Removal Motion,
that
(1) petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER:
"may be better served by a medical trust and an annuity which would
guarantee [payments] . . . for the duration of [CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER's] life." (Emphasis added) (Removal Motion,
3:19-22)
(2) the Assistant United States Attorney "was prepared to recommend
a settlement that would provide for CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER's
medical care for the rest of her life, no matter how long that might
be." (Removal Motion, 5:5-7)
(3) respondent United States of America had made a "proposal that
would ensure CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER receive
continued treatment and care for the rest of her life, however long
that time may be." (Removal Motion, 11:21-23)
Not only were these statements misleading, but they were disingenuous,
because the ultimate "settlement" provided no compensation to
the comatose mother, petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER,
transferring the entirety of the responsibility for her care and treatment
to the State of California. Despite the plaintive tone of the Assistant
United States Attorney that the counsel and Guardian ad litem did not have
the best interests of petitioners at heart, where in the
"settlement" did respondent United States provide the
"lifetime" support that its Assistant United States Attorney
promised in her papers?
19

Lest there be a tendency to ascribe inadvertence to this repetition of
misleading clauses, one need only look to the above cited
misrepresentation of the Assistant United States Attorney, that respondent
United States of America has "limited settlement funds."
(Removal Motion, 12:3-5)
Defendant United States of America presented no evidence, in fact, there
could be no such evidence, that an annuity would guarantee periodic
payments for the duration of the needs of petitioners. Despite any
evidence that purchase of an annuity would guarantee periodic payments for
the duration of the needs of petitioners, Judge Hatter obviously concluded
without evidentiary basis that defendant United States of America had
offered settlement that guaranteed periodic payments for the
duration of the needs of petitioners. It was an abuse of discretion for
Judge Hatter to grant the Removal Motion based on this unfounded
conclusion.
B. Consideration Of Attorney's Fees In Evaluation of Settlement
Offer Does Not Evince Conflict Of Interest.
Second, as to the alleged statement of counsel for the Guardian, that his
attorney's fees must be considered when deciding whether petitioners
should settle: The alleged statement, if true, merely shows that said
counsel was acting consistent
20

with the American rule for attorney's fees, which this Court has
consistently reaffirmed:
Under the longstanding "American rule," attorney's fees
generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation absent explicit
congressional authorization. Key Tronic v. United States
(1994) 511 U.S. 809, 809.
Even assuming that attorney's fees are necessary to achieve full
compensation, this justification alone is not sufficient to create an
exception to the American Rule in the absence of express congressional
authority. See F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber
Co., supra, at 128-129, 94 S.Ct., at 2164- 2165. In F.D. Rich, this
Court rejected the argument that attorney's fees should be awarded under
the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793, as amended, 80 Stat. 1139, 40 U.S.C. S
270a et seq., because the Act provided for recovery of "sums justly
due," 40 U.S.C. S 270b(a), and, unless fees were awarded, the
legislative intent in favor of full compensation would be frustrated.
417 U.S., at 128, 94 S.Ct., at 2164. In squarely rejecting this claim,
we found it to be nothing more than a "restate[ment] of one of the
oft-repeated criticisms of the American Rule." Ibid. Although this
Court acknowledged that "there is some force to the argument
that a party who must bear the cost of his attorneys' fees out of his
recovery is not made whole," we concluded that the
countervailing considerations
21

which support the American Rule argue against placing exclusive
reliance on the need to provide full compensation. [Emphasis Added] Summit
Valley Industries, Inc. v. Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
And Joiners of America (1982) 456 U.S. 717, 724
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the 'American
Rule' with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees. It has been
criticized in recent years, [footnote omitted] and courts have been
urged to find exceptions to it. [footnote omitted] It is also apparent
from our national experience that the encouragement of private action to
implement public policy has been viewed as desireable in a variety of
circumstances. But the rule followed in our courts with respect to
attorneys' fees has survived. It is deeply rooted in our history and in
congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's
province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by
respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals. [footnote omitted] Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company v. The Wilderness Society (1975) 421
U.S. 240, 270
The most recent affirmation by this Court that contingent attorney's fees
agreements are the sine qua non of our system of advocacy was by
Justice Ginsburg:
the interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be
so strong as to call for denial of a class action. . . . The policy at
the very core of the class action mechanism is to . . . provide the incentive
. . . worth
22

someone's (usually an attorney's) labor. (Emphasis added) Amchem
Products, Inc. v Windsor (1997) ___ US ___, 117 S.Ct. 2231,
2246, citing Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp. (1997) 109 F3d
338, 344
V. Rationale Of District Court Violates Federal
And State Law
The District Court obviously based removal of both the Guardian ad
litem and counsel on the fallacious proposition that an attorney with
a contingent fees agreement with a client, has an irreconcilable conflict
of interest with that client, notwithstanding that the attorney's fees
are expressly authorized by the FTCA, the attorney's fees are consistent
with the American rule for attorney's fees, and the form of the agreement
conforms with The Rules Of Professional Conduct in California.
It is a serious matter when counsel is removed from representation against
his will and that of his client. In this instance, Judge Hatter cavalierly
ruled that counsel for the original Guardian ad litem, acted against the
best interests of petitioners because said counsel comported himself
consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2678, the American rule for attorney's
fees, and the
23

California Rules of Professional Conduct. Further, Judge Hatter's
removal of a Guardian ad litem and Conservator, duly
appointed by a state court and still in good standing with said state
court, presents a justiciable friction between federal and
state jurisdiction.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Local Rules of The
United States District Court, Central District Of California,
and case law, only some of which is cited above, demonstrate that Judge
Hatter blatantly abused his discretion, all of this authority is merely
affirmation of the Fifth Amendment mandate that "No person shall be .
. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."
By removal of their Guardian ad litem and counsel, petitioners have
been deprived of both the liberty to select their representatives,
and property, a settlement meeting with the approval of the
original Guardian ad litem and counsel, who have always had
petitioners best interests in mind.
Judge Hatter has paternalistically decreed that it is in the best
interests of petitioners that they settle for a non- guaranteed annuity
(which was wholly inadequate), rather than have their claim decided by the
process of trial. Interestingly, Judge Hatter did not require that
comatose petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER receive
an annuity, or any other form of compensation, when he approved the
"settlement." By this egregious abuse of his discretion, he has
shifted the entirety of the responsibility for
24

the care and treatment of comatose petitioner CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER, from the culpably negligent respondent United States
of America, to the State of California, since respondent United States of
America has provided noannuity, or other form of compensation, to either
petitioner CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER or to her
estate.
As shown above, the contingent fees agreement is consistent with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2678, the American rule for attorney's fees and the California Rules
of Professional Conduct. If the District Court is not reversed,
litigants in that court, and many other courts, can anticipate similar
rulings based on the court's fallacious perception.
VI. Petitioners Have Been Deprived Of Their Right
To Appellate Review of The District Court's Ruling
28 U.S.C. § 12914 confers upon petitioners the right to
appellate review of the removal of their Guardian ad litem and counsel for
the Guardian. Forney v. Apfel (1998) ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct.
1984
_____________________
4The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. . . .
25

There has been no appellate review of the District Court's removal of the
original Guardian ad litem and counsel. Petitioners' prior Petition
for a Writ Of Mandamus, for review of the issues presented herein, was
denied by the Ninth Circuit, on August 12, 1996, on the basis that the
need for extraordinary relief had not been shown. By denial of the
extraordinary writ, the Ninth Circuit decreed that an appeal does lie to
review the issues herein, but it has violated its own decree, by its
denial of appellate review of the issues presented herein.
If there can be no appellate review of the removal of a Guardian ad
litem or counsel for such Guardian, then District Courts have
unbridled discretion to remove Guardians ad litem or counsel with
impunity. This means that a federal district court can dictate the course
of litigation before it. At the very least, this presents the appearance
of injustice.
VII. No Settlement Distribution To Be Undone If
Reversed
Although defendant United States of America, may have purchased an
annuity, petitioners have yet to receive any moneys as a result of the
"settlement" below. Any payments to plaintiff CLIENT
DAUGHTER are deferred until she reaches the age of majority;
plaintiff CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER is maintained in
her comatose state by funds provided by the
26

California Medical Assistance Program (Medi-Cal Act), California
Welfare & Institutions Code, § 14000 et seq; Title
22, California Code of Regulations, the state program enacted
pursuant to the federal Medicaid Act (Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396 et seq) to provide health
care services to recipients of public assistance and others. Therefore,
reversal of Judge Hatter's removal of the original Guardian ad litem
and counsel will not require accounting of monies already received.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant certiorari to insure that parties such as
petitioners have standing to raise the issues presented herein. If
petitioners do not have standing to raise the issues presented herein,
then there is a finite probability, not just a possibility, that injustice
in a variety of forms, will be perpetrated against incompetent parties in
the federal courts.
It is necessary that this court grant certiorari so that the chill
placed upon the vigorous advocacy of civil cases in all federal courts of
this nation, by Judge Hatter's cavalier removal of the original Guardian ad
litem and counsel for petitioners, will not be perpetuated.
27

Conventional wisdom is that over 95% of cases settle before trial. If an
attorney must be guarded during settlement discussions, and cannot be open
and frank, for fear of removal because of an alleged irreconcilable
conflict with the client, there will be few, if any, meaningful settlement
discussions, and a greater number of cases will go to trial, rather than
settle. If the 95% of all cases that settle, is reduced by a mere 5%, to
90%, and petitioners submit that it will be reduced much further, the
number of cases tried will DOUBLE. One does not have to be a
mathematician or attorney, to realize that such an explosion of the number
trials will paralyze the legal system as we know it.
Defendant United States of America has offered not a scintilla of evidence
that Cpl. CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, United
States Marine Corps, was anything other than a loving and caring husband
and father, who had the best interests of his comatose wife and newborn
daughter in mind at all times. It is a disgrace that this young man,
having served in the armed forces of this country, was removed from such a
respectable position, absent even a scintilla of evidence of conflict of
interest.
Nor has said defendant United States of America produced a scintilla of
evidence that counsel for the original Guardian ad litem, acted
other than in the best interests of petitioners, his clients. It is not a
mere incidence of the practice of law, when
28

a court rules that an attorney is unfit to represent clients due to an
irreconcilable conflict of interest, it is an event that cannot be
satisfactorily explained to clients.
As a result of the joint conduct of the United States Attorney, the
District Court and the two pro bono attorneys, at the very
least, there is the appearance of collusion. The State of California has
been forced to pay the entire cost of care and treatment of petitioner CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER, rather than respondent United States of America, which
has admitted liability for the negligent acts which rendered CLIENT
WIFE/MOTHER comatose.
At the very least, this court should grant certiorari to remand
this matter to the Ninth Circuit, affirming that petitioners, through
their duly appointed Guardian ad litem, have standing to raise the
issues presented herein, so that there will be appellate review of the
District Court's removal.
In the alternative, petitioners request that the court grant certiorari
to review all the issues presented herein, and consider transfer of the
related appeal to this court, so that all issues be resolved before one
forum.
Dated: August 21, 1998
Respectfully submitted,
Law Firm,
by:
R. Wayne Patterson
Attorneys for Petitioners
CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT
DAUGHTER
29

NOTICE OF RELATED APPELLATE CASE
Petitioners believe that the Court would wish to be notified of the case
of CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER, an Incompetent, by her
Permanent Conservator, and Guardian ad Litem, CLIENT
HUSBAND/FATHER; and CLIENT DAUGHTER, a
minor, by CLIENT HUSBAND/FATHER, her Guardian
ad Litem v. ROBERT K. HOLMES and MICHAEL A. SALAZAR, Ninth Circuit No.
98-55140.
In this related case, petitioners brought suit in California state court
against the replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel, alleging
legal malpractice, a state common law cause of action. The issues in that
case are whether the replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel
acted within the applicable standard of care when they accepted a wholly
inadequate settlement without consulting with any relative or
representative of petitioners, thus making these inadequately insured
attorneys, insurers for the injustice that has been perpetrated upon
petitioners by Judge Hatter's singular order or removal.
The replacement Guardian ad litem and counsel removed this related
action to the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, on the basis of collateral estoppel. Although the case was
originally assigned to the Honorable Steven V. Wilson, United States
District Court Judge, Judge Hatter saw to it that it was transferred to
his courtroom. Judge Hatter promptly denied petitioners timely motion to
remand, without hearing.
In that related action, the replacement Guardian ad litem and
counsel immediately brought a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6) on the basis of collateral estoppel. That motion was granted by
Judge Hatter, again without hearing. An appeal ensued. The matter has been
briefed, and awaits hearing. The estimated date of such hearing is May
1999.
Dated: August 21, 1998
Respectfully submitted,
Law Firm,
by:
R. Wayne Patterson
Attorneys for Petitioners
CLIENT WIFE/MOTHER and CLIENT
DAUGHTER
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